Some members of the Senate Armed Services
Committee have been blaming China for allegedly sending counterfeit electronics
to the U.S. for incorporation into military systems. Their questions and
comments suggest that Chinese "agents" are somehow infiltrating the U.S.
military and incorporating counterfeit components into key U.S. military
systems. I believe that this blame is slightly misplaced.
My team at the CALCE Electronic Products and Systems
Center, University of Maryland, is routinely asked to investigate counterfeits
electronics. We have found that the responsibility for counterfeiting often
lies with unauthorized American suppliers who commission the counterfeiting of
parts from businesses in foreign countries, including, but not limited to, the
Philippines, Vietnam, China and Thailand.
Senator John McCain, the top Republican on the Senate
panel to assess the counterfeiting problem, asserted that "The Chinese
government can stop it." However, the root cause of the problem is not the
Chinese, but rather the U.S. contractors who bought these parts from U.S.
unauthorized parts distributors (brokers) who commissioned the counterfeiting
of the parts for sale to the military contractors. Furthermore, these
commissioned, "made to order" parts are also coming from other foreign
countries (and the U.S.) that are willing to re-label parts for a profit.
Counterfeit electronics have indeed been incorporated
into many weapon systems, as well as into commercial avionics systems. In fact, the Senate committee's investigation
identified about 1,800 cases of suspect counterfeit electronics being sold to
the U.S. military. The total number of such parts is apparently greater than 1
million.
For example, Raytheon Missile Systems purchased some
1,500 Intel flash memory (semiconductor) devices for incorporation into the
Harm Targeting System (HTS), which is installed in F-16 fighter planes to
identify and track enemy radar systems. Raytheon purchased those parts from a
U.S. broker, rather than from the original device manufacturer or its
authorized distributor. This is analogous to purchasing a Gucci handbag on
Canal Street in New York City or across the street from the Rosslyn Metro in
Washington D.C.; it is very likely to be counterfeit. Without checking the
devices ahead of time, Raytheon installed those Intel chips on 28 circuit
boards destined for HTS modules. The military can be grateful that the boards
immediately failed, because Raytheon had to examine the boards to determine the
root cause of the problem and only then did they learn that the parts were all
counterfeit. Imagine if the boards worked (for a while) and were installed in a
weapon system!
The broker that Raytheon bought the parts from,
VisionTech Components Inc., has since been charged with the selling of
counterfeit parts, and the guilty parties have been sentenced. During the legal
process, it was learned that VisionTech personnel had the ability to alter the
labels and identities of electronic parts, and actually gave instructions to
foreign entities on how this should be accomplished and how such parts should
be shipped to the U.S. In other words,
the parts were commissioned by a U.S. company. In fact, the parts were not
necessarily "made/fabricated" in China, but were "altered" (mostly cosmetic
changes) in China and possibly in the U.S.
VisionTech is not the only U.S. parts broker that has "duped" military contractors by selling them counterfeit electronics. Another
broker, Red Hat (also called Red Hot) Distributors, operating within the
borders of the US, had its own component alteration equipment to make cosmetic
changes. My team at the CALCE Electronic
Products and Systems Center has encountered nearly 30 major counterfeit parts
this year alone (most of which the U.S. military is unaware of). It appears
that most of these parts came from unauthorized distributors that were highly
suspect.
The fact that foreign entities have the ability to
re-label parts at a low cost should not be a reason for the U.S. to blame them,
as that same ability has also been practiced here in the U.S. Instead, Senator
McCain and others, including the U.S. Justice Department, should hold Raytheon
accountable. What they did is unconscionable. Furthermore, U.S. customs agents
appear to not be doing their job. It is also surprising that Intel has not said
anything about the possibility of their parts being counterfeited. Surely they
know that possibility exists, since they have representation on the U.S.
counterfeiting task force.
Counterfeit parts incorporated into our military systems
could endanger the lives of our troops, as well as cause other catastrophic
consequences. The real blame lies with those brokers and contractors who focus
solely on convenience, and perhaps even profit over due diligence.